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ORGANIZING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: COMMUNITY
LEGAL CLINICS AND POLICE COMPLAINTS
IRINA CERIC*
RESUMI
Cet article donne un bref aperqu des debuts et de l'6volution des m6canismes ontariens
de traitement des plaintes contre la police et d6crit sommairement la proc6dure
actuelle, pour s'6tendre ensuite sur ses lacunes. L'auteur y traite du r6le d'une clinique
juridique communautaire dans la promotion des droits et d'une r6forme h cet 6gard.
Elle examine les nouvelles strat6gies de droit en mati~re de mauvaise conduite
policiire, de meme que les anciennes, et explique comment les cliniques pourraient
contribuer A une r6forme de la police et A l'ducation juridique de la population en
vue d'am6liorer la proc6dure de traitement des plaintes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Police killings are a stark reminder that police accountability is not a
theoretical or academic concept. Instead it is a necessary, potentially
life-saving governing principle of democracy, and should be an
integral part of any policing system. 1
The police, almost by definition, wield enormous power, possessing legally sanctioned
rights to stop, search, arrest, charge, use force, and kill.2 Even in the best of circum-
stances, the result is an inherent power imbalance between the police and their civilian
subjects; this imbalance is far greater in the communities of the poor and marginalized.
Any discussion of police-complaints processes and their significance must be located
within this context, one that recognizes that police accountability goes to the heart of
the most intimate of citizen-state relationships, affecting not only the criminal-justice
system, but broader issues of poverty, racism, homelessness, and informal economies 3
and, in turn, the social movements that address those issues. Police-complaint mech-
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1. Community Coalition Concerned about Civilian Oversight of Police, In Search of Police Account-
ability: Report of the Community Coalition Concerned about Civilian Oversight of Police (Toronto,
1997) [unpublished].
2. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 at s. 25(1).
3. I use this phrase to refer to economic activity outside the regulated, formal economy, including work
in the sex trade, panhandling, "street work" such as cleaning windshields, and drug sales.
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
anisms are integral to a functioning police force, supplying bargaining power to the
subject-police relationship and serving as a primary tenet of overall accountability. As
a result, studies and task forces have repeatedly called for effective police-com-
plaints mechanisms, 4 yet the problem of how to best address the failure of those
mechanisms and the still-larger issue of police misconduct remains a contentious
one at both the legislative and community level, and among police officers and
their associations.
The police-complaints procedure has also presented crucial questions for organiza-
tions that provide services and support to groups that have traditionally borne the brunt
of police misconduct-questions that boil down to a choice of unquestioning partici-
pation, absolute withdrawal, or constructive engagement in the process. At Parkdale
Community Legal Services (PCLS), law students have traditionally assisted clients
with filing complaints against police, but recent changes to the police-complaints
system, which have effectively eliminated civilian oversight of the complaints pro-
cess, have led PCLS staff and students to question the effectiveness and prudence of
participating in the formal police-complaints proceedings. This debate has added to
pre-existing concerns about police retribution against complainants, the lack of
adequate and appropriate remedies, and the inability of the complaints process to
produce fundamental changes to police conduct or policy. The debate is now shifting
to a strategic consideration of how to provide meaningful alternatives to existing
police-complaints procedures for members of the community who have been victims
of police misconduct, or violence through community-focused legal clinics, the
consideration of which is the focus of this article.
Added to these concerns is a practical one that appreciates that a legal clinic, like any
organization that professes more than charity in the face of poverty, must rely to some
extent on its reputation in the community. To the extent that policing is seen as an
important issue by members of the community, individually or collectively, commu-
nity legal clinics must have some response that goes beyond filling out a complaints
form and leaving any resolution in the hands of the police. This is not to suggest that
clinics have to react with equal vigilance to every possible issue, but it does mean
recognizing that the modern police force is an inextricable element of the poverty
regime perpetuated by neo-liberal governments: police are both the "occupying
army" ensuring that the full force of the law can be applied to the poor every day,
and the most visible oppositional force to collective action at the grassroots. Such
opposition requires creative, flexible, and multi-pronged strategies from organizers and
reformers.
The starting point of this article is a short history of police-complaints mechanisms in
Ontario, and a brief outline of the current process, the shortcomings of which are
discussed in greater detail. Two primary alternatives to a formal complaints processes
4. See generally C.E. Lewis, "Police Complaints in Metropolitan Toronto: Perspectives of the Public
Complaints Commissioner" in A.J. Goldsmith, ed., Complaints Against the Police: The Trend to
External Review (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 153.
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are canvassed. The first is a discussion of litigation strategies, such as traditional
common law claims and more novel constitutional challenges specifically aimed at
the substance of the complaints process itself, as opposed to lawsuits focused on the
underlying police misconduct. Examples drawn from U.S. jurisprudence will be used
to consider the likely success of a test case brought on behalf of Canadian complain-
ants. The second and perhaps more obvious project is participation in a collective,
community-based organization, coalition, and/or campaign aimed at addressing polic-
ing issues. Therefore, I propose to examine previous PCLS initiatives in the context
of the legal clinic system and the work of other Toronto groups and campaigns. While
this analysis is necessarily focused on the possible role of legal clinics, I approach it
within the context of general community-organizing principles, locating any conclu-
sions outside of a strictly legal or individualistic framework. This article has two
separate but related objectives: providing a legally based analysis of-and a commu-
nity-oriented, political response to-the police-complaints process.
II. HISTORY AND CONTEXT: POLICE COMPLAINTS AND COMMUNITY
RESPONSE
Understanding the evolution of the police-complaints system in Toronto specifically,
and Ontario more generally, requires an understanding of the broader objectives and
motivations underlying the system's development. In a general sense, these goals may
be seen as the promotion of accountability, or at least the appearance of it, reduction
of police misconduct, and improvement in police-community relations. Police-com-
plaints processes, as a particular aspect of policing policy and procedure, have been
inextricably tied to general public discourse on policing, but at times they have taken
on particular salience, especially in times of crises of legitimacy, when public opinion
toward police is inflamed following controversial or notorious incidents, and those
times when less visible, yet pernicious or systemic problems are seen to be ignored or
inadequately addressed. As catalysts, both developments may be seen as versions of
the same fundamental problem, despite having enormously different effects and
requiring differential responses from police and the community. In analyzing the
forces affecting on police-complaints mechanisms, it has been suggested that the
starting point must be a rejection of the "bad apple" theory of police misconduct, in
place of a systemic approach that evaluates political influence, police culture, and
community response. 5 Such an analysis is necessary in order to evaluate different
strategies for dealing with police misconduct and to comply with the overall approach
of Ontario legal clinics to law reform and community organizing, an approach focused
on collective, long-term responses to legal and legally entwined problems. 6
5. D. Martin, "Organizing for Change: A Community Law Response to Police Misconduct" (1993) 4:1
Hastings Women's L.J. 131 at 138.
6. See, for example, J.E. Mosher, "Poverty Law: A Case Study" in Ontario Legal Aid Review, Report
of the Ontario Legal Aid Review: A Blueprint for Publicly Funded Legal Services, vol. 3 (Toronto:
Publications Ontario, 1997) (Chair John D. McCamus) 913 at 933-36.
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A. The Evolution of the Police-Complaints Process
Even located in this complex context, the development of Ontario's police-complaints
process was both protracted and contentious: seven years elapsed before the initial
recommendation of an independent civilian commissioner of complaints resulted in a
three-year pilot project.7 The reasons for this delay were largely political, as police
associations, community organizations, and members of the provincial government
debated over the form that a complaints system ought to take, particularly the scope
of any civilian oversight or participation. Fuelled by the controversy generated by a
series of high-profile allegations of police misconduct, there were no fewer than four
official inquiries into the complaints process between 1975 and 1980, all of which
produced reports. Two unsuccessful police-complaints bills were introduced into the
legislature. 8 In 1981, an Act 9 instituting a pilot complaints project in Metropolitan
Toronto was proclaimed, establishing the Office of the Public Complaints Com-
missioner (PCC), and allowing for significant civilian participation in the review
of public complaints against the police. The pilot project would became permanent
in 1984, maintaining much of the same structure and role, along with some key
changes.10
The 1984 legislation" created a Public Complaints Investigation Bureau, a separate
division within the police force staffed by experienced officers which had the resources
and "staff to effectively receive, record and investigate complaints and inquiries.' 12
The Bureau was required to supply interim progress reports of all complaints investi-
gations to the complainants, the officers named in the complaint, and the PCC.
Completed investigations were reported to the Chief of Police, the complainant, the
officers investigated, and the PCC, whereupon the Chief or a designate could mediate
a resolution between the complainant and the police, call for a disciplinary hearing,
or "take no further action." 13 As a result, much of the initial investigation and
decision-making remained vested within the police force, although the PCC could
investigate complaints (and under limited circumstances, initiate complaints). The
PCC could review the decision of a Chief at the request of a complainant, an officer
who had been investigated, or if it was in the public interest to do so. Upon review of
an investigation, the PCC could appoint a board of inquiry to reconsider the matter
and inquire into activities beyond those usually considered under the rubric of police
misconduct. 14 Throughout the process, the PCC was to monitor individual complaints
and make recommendations about police policies, as significant issues arose in the
7. Lewis, supra note 4 at 154.
8. A. Goldsmith & S. Farson, "Complaints Against the Police in Canada: A New Approach" (1987)
Calm. L.R. 615 at 616.
9. Metropolitan Police Force Complaints Project Act, S.O. 1981, c. 63, repealed.
10. Goldsmith & Farson, supra note 8 at 620.
11. Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints Act, S.O. 1984, c. 63 [hereinafter MTPFCA].
12. Ibid. at s. 5.
13. Ibid. at s. 90.
14. Goldsmith & Farson, supra note 8 at 620.
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course of the PCC's work.15 This function should be seen as significant as the PCC's
investigative role, because it allowed for consideration of systemic problems and consolida-
tion of individual complaints into a report that would be seen by the Chief, police associations,
the Attomey-General, and the Solicitor-General---thereby placing complaints within a polit-
ical forum. In 1990, this complaints legislation was incorporated into the Police Services Act,
(PSA)16 giving the PCC jurisdiction over the entire province of Ontario.
Everything changed in November 1997, when the Conservative government gutted the
complaints section of the PSA, disbanding the Police Complaints Commissioner, and
drastically reducing opportunities for civilian oversight. 17 The new system is overseen to
some extent by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS), a provin-
cial body that predated the PSA amendments and does not deal exclusively, or even
primarily, with police complaints. The loss of the PCC is the current system's biggest
liability, as all investigations are internal and performed exclusively by the police; even
reviews to the OCCPS can do no more than transfer a complaint to another police service in
the province. Unlike the PCC, the OCCPS is not made aware of a complaint unless the
complainant brings it to them; there is no automatic and central oversight of all complaints
in the province. Further, the OCCPS cannot intervene in a complaint on its own accord; again,
the complainant must initiate any review.1 8
Other major changes included the immediate division of all complaints into two catego-
ries-policy or service-differentiating the review, options available for each type of
complaint, and allowing only those directly affected to make complaints. Under the
previous system, eyewitnesses and others closely affected were also potential complain-
ants, while the 1981 pilot project had allowed anyone aware of any incident to make
third-party complaints. 19 Investigation and evaluation of complaints was also changed,
giving the Chief of Police much greater decision-making power. The Chief can now decide
not to deal with a complaint for three reasons: if it was not filed within six months of the
incident, if it is "frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith," or if the complainant was not
directly affected by the incident.20 (last modified: 2 July 1999). This is the current
system-one that has moved from significant civilian oversight to almost exclusive
internal resolution.
B. The PCLS "Police Story"
PCLS involvement in policing issues has been inconsistent, varying over time as a
result of staff and student interest and other community efforts and activities. These
barriers to involvement will be considered later, following a brief excursion through
15. MTPFCA, supra note 11 at s.21.
16. R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15 [hereinafter PSA].
17. Police Services Amendment Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 8.
18. Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, Resolving Complaints: Your Guide for Filing
Complaints About Police Conduct, Services and Policies in Ontario (Toronto: OCCPS, n.d.).
19. Goldsmith & Farson, supra note 8 at 620.
20. Toronto Police Service, Professional Standards: Public Complaints Process, online: Toronto Police
Servicehttp:llwww.mtps.on.ca/professionalstandards/complaint.html
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
PCLS history, a history that has been fairly well documented in the literature, if not
within the clinic itself.21 Since 1971, when PCLS opened its doors as one of Canada's
first community legal-aid clinics, policing issues have formed a significant proportion
of the clinic's work. In addition to its in-house work, PCLS has worked in coalition
with community groups working on policing issues, groups whose names, numbers,
and successes have varied over the years.
The early 1990s saw an especially concerted move towards policing work at PCLS,
with clinic co-director Dianne Martin (a former criminal defence lawyer) and other
staff and students involved in a project aimed at exposing police misconduct, using
the "techniques of organizing, outreach, lobbying, law reform, casework and central
coordination of information to find remedies. '22 This project had its genesis in PCLS's
involvement in a public inquiry23 into allegations of serious misconduct in the Toronto
police force's Internal Affairs Unit. PCLS represented a woman who had reported an
officer who had extorted sexual favours from her, only to find that he received a
lenient internal penalty instead of facing criminal charges, and that promises of
anonymity made to her were not kept.24 PCLS's goal during the inquiry was
twofold: to represent the clinic's client as a starting point, and to advocate to
broaden the scope of the inquiry and create a public record, providing a basis for
future reform.25 During the same period, PCLS's Landlord and Tenant Division
was involved in work against homelessness and became involved in a project run
by Street Health, a progressive health care organization, which found that unac-
ceptable numbers of homeless people suffered physical violence at the hands of
the police. 26 Street Health's report resulted in the formation of the Coalition Against
Police Violence, of which PCLS became a member.
As a result of these two projects, PCLS began using specific strategies to address
police misconduct and violence, particularly collecting case histories of people report-
ing police assaults, providing referrals for legal action, assistance with filing to the
PCC (anonymously, if necessary), outreach and educational work to other organiza-
tions, and generally providing a community base for information and history.27
PCLS work was in turn preceded by the work of community groups such as Citizens
Independent Review of Police Activities (CIRPA), a coalition formed in 1981 to
monitor police misconduct and provide an alternative to the formal police-complaints
21. R. Kuszelewski & D. Martin, "The Perils of Poverty: Prostitutes' Rights, Police Misconduct, and
Poverty Law" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ. 835; R. Kuszelewski, "Clarion Call for Action on the
Police" (1992) vol. 8 (N.S.) no. 2 Law Union News 1; Martin, supra note 5.
22. Kuszelewski & Martin, supra note 21 at 846-47.
23. Ontario Commission on Police Services into the Policies, Practices and Procedures of the Internal
Affairs Unit of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, June 1990.
24. Martin, supra note 5 at 169.
25. Ibid.
26. Kuszelewski & Martin, supra note 21 at 13.
27. Ibid.
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process. 28 CIRPA offered a 24-hour complaint line, referrals, and legal information,
and collected data from complaints to use in law reform work. The then newly formed
PCC stated that CIRPA's activities were useful in raising issues beyond the PCC's
scope.29
There is a dense history of activism on police issues in Toronto, and many groups have
emerged, often spurred by tragic events or particularly nefarious misconduct. Any list
would necessarily include groups such as the Black Action Defence Committee,
formed in 1988 after the acquittal of a police officer charged with the shooting death
of a black man and still active on policing issues, including participation in public
inquiries; Anti-Racist Action, a youth-based group who found themselves a target of
the police unit assigned to investigate hate groups; the recent Coalition Against Racist
Police Violence, which also worked on incidents outside of Toronto such as the death
of native activist Dudley George; as well as agencies (for example, the Toronto Rape
Crisis Centre/Multicultural Women Against Rape) and organizations with a broader
focus (for example, Chinese Canadian National Council, Urban Alliance on Race
Relations).
PCLS's current policing activities have focused on Community Action Policing
(CAP), the so-called targeted policing program. CAP, the Toronto police force's
$2 million 1999 summer program, allowed additional officers to patrol "problem
areas," with a focus on increased police presence and preventative measures,
including surveillance and interviews with people not suspected of any crime.
PCLS was among the founders of the Coalition Against Targeted Policing (CATP)
and has continued some of the work initiated by the group, most notably the
CopWatch Hotline, a phone line located at PCLS to provide information and gather
reports.
III. TODAY'S CHALLENGES: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
A. The Police-Complaints Process
Perhaps the current police-complaints system is best evaluated in the context of bias.
Since the general tenet in Canadian law is that perception of bias is as important and
as damaging as actual bias, the current police-complaints system can neither be
perceived as fair nor be considered fair, since police generally investigate themselves,
with only minimal and ineffectual civilian oversight in the form of OCCPS. This
analysis is supported by recent complaints statistics:
* From May 1998 to May 1999, 531 complaints were filed, with 162 dismissed
outright (almost one-third) and only 148 actually investigated. 30
28. Martinsupranote5 at 171.
29. Ibid.
30. G. Abbate, "Complaints Against Cops Often Scrapped" The Globe and Mail (20 October 1999) All.
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
0 1% of complaints resulted in disciplinary action against police officers. During
the time of the PCC, the level was 5%--still low, but the drop is significant. 31
0 During the time of the PCC, there were also more complaints filed, an average
of 750 per year.32
Even before the 1997 changes, complainants had mixed expectations and reviews of
their participation in the formal complaints process. A 1994 study of Toronto com-
plainants found that about a quarter of new complainants did not know who would
investigate their complaint, but that 70% of those who thought that their complaint
would be investigated by the police did not think that was a good thing.33 After the
study participants were informed of the complaints process, 56% thought that the
investigation would be more fair with an outside investigation, and 40% stated "that
police should not investigate themselves. ' '34 The complainants were also largely
unfamiliar with the PCC, but even of those who knew of its existence, 43% stated that
they did not think that it would make a difference in the handling of their complaint. 35
Perhaps the most telling response came from the group of complainants who had
completed the process: only 14% thought they had received a fair investigation, while
35% thought that the police were biased, 16% felt that not all the evidence was looked
at, and 5% thought that the police had lied.36 The study concluded that the "most salient
feature in the minds of complainants remains the fact that the police investigate the
police, ' 37 and that "many complainants remain angry and alienated as a direct result
of their experience of making a formal complaint against the police."' 38 While these
conclusions were no doubt disheartening at the time, their significance in today's
context is even greater: if complainants were dissatisfied while the PCC remained in
place, the only plausible inference is that it is even worse today. In fact, the beliefs of
the complainants in the 1994 study are borne out by comparisons between internal and
external complaints mechanisms that have repeatedly revealed that internal review
systems are problematic and often doomed to fail.39
The public's seeming distrust of the police-complaints process and the reluctance of
those who have experienced police violence or harassment to engage in the process is
exacerbated by the perceived lack of remedies. If only 1% of complaints result in
31. Ibid.
32. Goldsmith & Farson supra note 8 at 621.
33. T. Landau, "When Police Investigate Police: A View from Complainants" (July 1996) Can. J.
Criminology 219 at 300-01.
34. Ibid at 301.
35. Ibi at 304.
36. Ibid at 306.
37. Ibid at 309.
38. Ibid at310.
39. A.J. Goldsmith, "External Review and Self-Regulation: Police Accountability and the Dialectic of
Complaints Procedures" in A.J. Goldsmith, ed., Complaints Against the Police: The Trend to Exter-
nal Review (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 13 at 19.
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disciplinary action against offending officers, 40 the impetus to get involved is simply
not present. And getting involved in the complaints'system is not easy for many of
those who are victims of police misconduct. First and foremost, would-be complain-
ants must overcome the primary barrier of identification of one's problem with the
police as a legal problem rather than a personal matter, subject to a complaints system
and at least the promise of redress. 41 Some of the further barriers are more obvious
but can be equally daunting: an inability to speak and/or write English or French (there
is no longer an interpretation service available, as there was at the PCC), literacy
(complaints must be made in writing), and the necessity of having a mailing address
to receive replies.
For some of the most vulnerable would-be complainants there is also the risk of
retaliation;42 if one is often in contact with the police, especially the same officers,
filing a complaint that will be investigated by the same police force can be a dubious
proposition. Considering the meagre results available, opening oneself to possible
retaliation may not seem worth it, particularly for people who already feel threatened
by criminal charges or as a result of being "known" to the police. 43 Retaliation can
take many forms, from increased harassment, to the unwanted attention that
accompanies those with reputations as "troublemakers," to the laying of criminal
charges directly resulting from the complaint, as occurred in one notorious PCLS
case. 44 Finally, complainants must consider that they will be required to prove any
allegations made in their complaints, that proof is required on a criminal standard-
beyond a reasonable doubt-and that given the resources on the other side, it is very
likely that it will seem as though it is the complainant, rather than the police, on trial.45
Beyond the fate of individual complaints and complainants, the fact is that police
complaints contribute little to fundamental change in policing policy or behaviour.
The current complaints system is simply too fragmented, and the number of
complaints so small, that the police can very well afford to ignore individual
complaints. Since there is no longer a province-wide clearinghouse of all com-
plaints and the recurrent issues and problems arising from them, the system as a
whole simply does not register on any level where significant decisions are made.
The system's shortcomings are further exacerbated by the political context in which
policing in Ontario is located: police associations enjoy unprecedented power, pres-
tige, and access to decision makers; police ask for and receive ever-increasing budgets;
and policing as social control of the poor, marginalized, and politically active in the
form of targeted policing and "safe streets" 46 legislation has become overt and even
40. Abbate, supra note 30.
41. Mosher, supra note 6 at 917-18.
42. See Ibid. at 20-21.
43. Interview with Mary Birdsell, staff lawyer, Justice for Children and Youth, 11 February 2001.
44. In 1996, a PCLS client was charged with mischief after filing what police considered to be a false
complaint. The student caseworker who filed the complaint was subpoenaed to testify against the
complainant during the criminal trial, although his subpoena was later withdrawn.
45. Kuszelewski & Martin, supra note 21 at 13.
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celebrated. In other words, the dearth of meaningful options within the police-com-
plaints process is mirrored by a lack of political will to address the issues raised
by complainants.
B. The Community-Focused Legal Clinic Approach
Critique is always difficult, even when it comes in the form of considered and
constructive internal review, yet it is a necessary part of any organization's growth
and progress. In terms of policing, PCLS's work has been stymied by several factors:
lack of institutional memory, a lack of "fit" among the clinic's other areas of work and
the precarious nature of reactive or defensive ad hoc organizing, which also affects
other groups and potential coalition partners. The first of these problems is perhaps
the most ironic, since former PCLS staff members have repeatedly stressed the
importance of the clinic as a central base for organizing or a "permanent home for
reform,"47 specifically because of its "history, stability and resources. '48 Yet staff and
student interest in policing does vary over time, particularly among students, who are
themselves a transitory element within the clinic, yet do most of the day-to-day
casework. Lawyers and community legal workers (CLWs) are generally permanent
employees of clinics and represent the most likely source of collective memory in
terms of past strategies, activities, resources, and victories. Unfortunately, the volume
of work undertaken by most clinic staff and students tends to drain energy away from
anything but the most pressing matters, meaning that organization of resources or the
passing on of project histories requires extraordinary persistence and a commitment
to the cause.
The difficulty of maintaining institutional memory is only increased by the fact that
policing does not have an obvious home among the types of law that make up the
community legal clinic's "menu" as defined in Ontario's Legal Aid Services Act:
housing and shelter, income maintenance, social assistance, human rights, health,
employment, and education.49 It has been suggested that policing ought to be distrib-
uted among all working groups within the clinic system, in an effort to create a
co-ordinated base for law reform. 50 At PCLS, for example, the CopWatch hotline is
being shared by students in all divisions and is being co-ordinated by one of the
articling students.
The final and perhaps most overarching difficulty in legal clinics' approach is that
policing work is often reactive and ad hoc, usually as a result of violence, such as a
police shooting, or as a reaction to a particular policy or legal development, such as
CAP or a public inquiry. Perhaps these sorts of catalysts are needed to overcome the
energy gap noted above, but this type of organizing can be extremely problematic, not
46. Safe Streets Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 8.
47. Martin, supra note 5 at 172.
48. Kuszelewski & Martin, supra note 21 at 13.
49. Legal Aid Services Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 26, s. 2.
50. Martin, supra note 5 at 174.
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only in practical terms such as those of institutional memory, but more important, in
terms of consistency and credibility, among allies and opponents. Forever reacting
does not allow for the real work that is required to achieve fundamental change, in
policing as with any other issue, because it does not foster the creation of alternatives
in either process and resources, or contribute to a collective paradigm shift in police
accountability, and does not allow for policing issues to be included in multi-issue
coalitions and movements. Always playing defence, without any regard for offensive
tactics or strategy, is not a problem limited to community legal clinics, by any means,
nor is it something for which blame can be laid, but it is something that activists and
lawyers alike must remain mindful of.
IV. SOLUTIONS: FROM COMPLAINTS TO COMMUNITY
A. Legal Strategies: New and Old
Although the use of the law to address police misconduct in Canada is not new,
traditional legal strategies have not been utilized to the extent they could be, and new
and creative forms of legal action remain to be explored. The most common civil
proceedings have been those based on the tort actions of negligence, battery,51 and
malicious prosecution, 52 and, to a lesser extent, assault and false imprisonment. The
novel actions refer to an emerging area of U.S. law that has yet to be tested in Canada:
constitutionally based liability for failure to provide an adequate police-complaints
process. Each of these doctrines has its own specific problems in terms of establishing
liability, but its application is also limited by the general barriers to justice faced by
would-be plaintiffs: inability to pay for legal counsel, the unavailability of legal aid
for such actions, 53 the possibility of being held liable for costs if the action is
unsuccessful, and the difficult-to-quantify yet important elements of time, energy, and
loss of privacy. These barriers are slightly altered when the plaintiff is represented by
a community legal clinic, although the result is more a shifting of burdens than an
elimination of risk or barriers. Litigation strategies, especially novel test cases, are
notoriously resource-hungry and could easily drain the capacity of the average clinic.
These problems are by no means minor, but in the current context of police culture
and provincial policy, the pressing need for concerted and offensive legal strategies
to combat police misconduct outweighs the potential hazards.
Finally, any consideration of legal strategies and policing requires the acknowledge-
ment that as public authorities, the police enjoy a level of legal immunity, particularly
as set out in the Public Authorities Protection Act (PAPA). 54 Statutory protections only
apply, however, when public authorities act within the scope of their statutory or other
51. See, for example, Berntt v. Vancouver (City) (1997), 33 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 (B.C.S.C.), reversed on
other grounds (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4) 403 (B.C.C.A.).
52. See, for example, Nelles v. Ontario (1989), 49 C.C.L.T. 217 (S.C.C.).
53. Tort actions for damage are not eligible for Legal Aid certificate coverage: Legal Aid Ontario,
Improving Legal Aid in Ontario: A Guide to Legal Aid Services and Hourly Maximums (June 1999)
at 19. See also Legal Aid Service Act, 1998, supra note 49 at s. 13(3)(e).
54. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.38 [hereinafter PAPA].
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public duty; when that duty is exceeded, the protections no longer apply. 55 As a result,
plaintiffs alleging police misconduct are likely not bound by the PAPA, so long as the
misconduct falls outside of what would be considered statutory duty or authority, and
the police are not able to demonstrate honest belief that they were acting in the course
of duty.56
i. The Common Law Tradition
Perhaps the most notorious civil suit against the police in negligence is the Jane Doe
case,57 the culmination of one woman's 12-year battle for accountability and redress
that followed her realization that the man who had raped her in her own apartment
was a serial rapist with a specific pattern of violence that the police were aware of but
did not share with women in the rapist's neighbourhood. Jane Doe received general
damages of $175,000, and $37,301 in special damages, as well as the vote of Toronto
City Council urging the police not to appeal, and an apology from then chief of police
David Boothby. Jane Doe's legal victory was certainly an inspiring one, but it is not
a case that would have been within reach of many would-be plaintiffs: the novel legal
issues raised attracted experienced lawyers willing to work pro bono, the plaintiff had
much support within the feminist community, and she was able to bear the personal
toll that a lawsuit can take. Yet negligence as a legal doctrine is probably the most
accessible of the tort claims available.
Unlike the more archaic intentional torts, negligence requires no specific intent, and
the other legal tests required to sustain an action fit well within the types of incidents
involving police that are likely to result in litigation and the evidence that is likely to
exist. There can be little argument with the proposition that police owe a duty of care
to citizens. "Caring," in fact, is the basis of their very existence, just as the phrase "To
serve and protect" suggests. The question of how far that duty extends is raised only
in cases where the matter is one of omission, as in Jane Doe, rather than commission,
as would be the case where plaintiffs suffered injury or loss as a result of police
(mis)conduct. Standard of care may be established both by reference to stated police
policy and by comparison to other police forces, although the question of what is
"reasonable" police behaviour may at times proceed without the benefit of a good
example.
In comparison, the intentional torts have much more specific doctrinal requirements.
This rigidity is particularly evident in the tort of malicious prosecution, which requires
that the plaintiff demonstrate "malice, or a primary purpose other than that of carrying
the law into effect."' 58 The test for battery is less onerous, requiring the plaintiff to
55. See, for example, Croft v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board (1993), 15 O.R.
(3d) 216 (C.A.).
56. Ibid
57. Jane Doe v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Commissioners of Police (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4"') 697 [hereinaf-
ter Jane Doe].
58. Nelles v. Ontario, supra note 52 at 229.
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prove that she was injured by the direct act(s) of the defendant, who has to prove
absence of both intent and negligence, to escape liability.59
Additionally, within the particular context of student-run clinics, tort claims would
generally be limited to claims of $6,000,60 as law students do not have standing before
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and are limited to civil actions in the Small
Claims Courts. Since substantial tort claims would require the active participation of
supervising lawyers in any court proceedings, it would seem that these cases should
be limited to test cases or those to which the clinic has a substantial commitment for
other reasons. This limitation also addresses the fact that tort claims are almost by
definition particular to the individual plaintiff and do little, if anything, to support
broader arguments for law reform or changes in police policy or practice, with limited
exceptions such as Jane Doe.6 1
ii. Claiming Damages: Charter Breaches Arising out of Inadequate Complaints
A growing body of U.S. law has found municipalities liable for failure to provide
adequate investigation of complaints against the police. Beginning with the 1987 case
Fiacco v. Rensselaer,62 U.S. courts have held that deliberate indifference to police
misconduct can be demonstrated by failure to reasonably investigate complaints. 63
The starting points in attempting to apply this reasoning to the Canadian context is
section 1983 of the U.S. federal code,64 which legislates the right to bring civil actions
for deprivation of constitutional rights and provides the statutory basis for bringing
claim. This requirement of legislative authority to claim damages for constitutional
breaches does not represent a particularly onerous hurdle for prospective Canadian
plaintiffs. Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms65 allows for
the enforcement of Charter rights or freedoms through legal action before a court of
competent jurisdiction and makes available a wide range of remedies, so long as they
are appropriate and just in the circumstances of the case. 66 The most common remedies
for Charter breaches have been changes to legislation (for example, reading in or out
of certain clauses) and injunctive relief during proceedings, but damages for Charter
breaches have been awarded, 67 although action for damages under section 24(1) will
59. Dahlberg v. Naydiuk (1969), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 319 at 328-329.
60. On April 2, 2001, this maximum increased to $10,000.
61. See, for example, the report of the City of Toronto's Audit of the Metro Toronto Police Sexual
Assault Squad: J. Griffiths, C.A., Review of the Investigation of Sexual Assaults - Toronto Police
Service (Toronto: City Auditor, 1999).
62. 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Fiacco].
63. H.G. Beh, "Municipal Liability for Failure to Investigate Citizen Complaints Against Police" (1998)
25 Fordham Urban L.J. 209 at 231.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
65. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 192 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,
[hereinafter the Charter].
66. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4ded. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 37.2(g).
67. E. Meehen et al., The 1999 Annotated Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Car-
swell, 1998) at 716-17.
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generally preclude a declaratory action for invalidity under section 52 of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982,68 and damages for Charter breach may not be granted where damages
under other heads of damage are granted, even if there is proof of a Charter breach. 69
The doctrine of deliberate indifference in relation to municipalities as set out by the
United States Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris70 requires a three-part
analysis:
" examination of the municipal program in question (in this case, the supervision
and training of officers), particularly whether the program's inadequacy was
likely to result in constitutional violations;
" demonstration of culpable deliberateness in terms of the municipality's decision-
making process in developing policy and programs, an inquiry which requires a
standard higher than negligence;
" causation on a but-for basis, expressed as proof that the municipality's inade-
quate program actually caused the constitutional injury.71
The Canton deliberate-indifference test is an onerous one for potential plaintiffs,
requiring specific evidence of municipal policy and procedure, a close causal connec-
tion, and records indicating the intentions of decision makers, such as minutes of
meetings and debates.
Elements of this analysis have already been recognized in Canadian decisions about
the tort liability of public authorities, where courts have differentiated between policy
decisions and the carrying out of that policy in a reasonable manner. The Supreme
Court of Canada has held that policy decisions are not reviewable, but that actions
undertaken as a result of policy are reviewable and that unreasonable procedure can
lead to liability in tort. 72 This analysis, although borrowed from tort law, ought to
underscore plaintiffs seeking to hold municipalities liable for the provision of inade-
quate police-complaints processes, since the focus of litigation is on the quality of
procedures, not their presence or absence. In this respect, Ontario's move from a
complaints system characterized by overarching civilian oversight in the form of the
PCC to one based largely on internal review is itself significant, and depending on the
legislative history, could be seen as either a policy decision or an operational decision
within a static policy of commitment to police accountability, as is suggested by the
Declaration of Principles set out in the PSA.73
Having met the preliminary legal hurdles of legislative authority and the standard of
deliberate indifference, the basis for police-complaints Charter cases is the question of
68. Guimond v. Quebec (Procureur general), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347.
69. Jane Doe, supra note 57 at 701.
70. 489 U.S. 378 (1989) [hereinafter Canton].
71. Beh, supra note 63 at 223-25.
72. Just v. B.C., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228.
73. PSA, supra note 16 at s. 1.
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whether a more effective system to address citizen complaints would have pre-
vented the officer from inflicting a constitutional injury upon the plaintiff. The
necessary premise at the core of this claim is whether effective citizen complaint
review would have led to better performance by the errant police officer.74
In other words, police misconduct in the absence of municipal failure to adequately
supervise their staff does not give rise to liability; it is the failure to adequately address
misconduct that establishes liability.75 There are three routes to meeting this central
burden and establishing that inadequate complaints procedures made it likely that a
plaintiff's constitutional rights would be violated by a police officer.76 The first
involves attempting to prove that a police force has a "climate of lawlessness" as a
result of rampant misconduct, and that the offending officer(s) acted as a result of this
environment. The second method looks to the history and background of the offending
officer(s) and attempts to demonstrate that misconduct condoned in the past allowed
the pattern of behaviour to continue unchecked. Finally, a plaintiff can also use an
officer's employment record to argue that had previous incidents been addressed in
an adequate and timely manner, the officer would have been disciplined or terminated
prior to the incident in question.
All three methods require detailed evidence of the resolution of complaints laid by the
public and, to a lesser extent, internal discipline mechanisms. The court in Fiacco held
that unproven and/or unsustained complaints should nevertheless be entered into
evidence, as the response to all complaints is significant in determining the adequacy
of a complaints system and that complaints that were not investigated simply under-
score a plaintiff's claim that complaints are not taken seriously and do little to prevent
future misconduct.77 The last methods require access to the records of particular
officers, an issue that has received considerable attention in the criminal courts. Two
recent cases considered the disclosure of records held by the PCC, OCCPS, and Chief
of Police, and while both held that such records may be disclosed to the defendant in
a criminal proceeding, they differed on the approach. In R. v. Altunamaz,78 the court
held that records held by the PCC and OCCPS are third-party records and could be
disclosed only through the process set out in R. v. O'Connor,79 which requires that
the defence prove that the documents are likely to be relevant. In a case decided only
one month later,80 the court held that documents in control of the Police Service,
OCCPS, and PCC are to be disclosed in the same manner as any other materials in the
possession of the Crown, as per R. v. Stinchcombe.81 How these cases translate into
74. Beh, supra note 63 at 226.
75. Ibd at 215-16.
76. Ibid at 229.
77. Ibid at 231-32.
78. [1999] O.J. No. 2262 (Ont. Sup. CJ.).
79. (1995), 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
80. R. v. Scaduto, [1999] O.J. No. 1906 (Ont. Sup. C.J.).
81. (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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the civil courts remains to be seen, as plaintiffs do not enjoy the same level of
disclosure rights 82 as criminal defendants, and the issue of privilege would certainly
be relevant in regards to records relating to disciplinary actions and other legal or
quasi-legal police activities.
Nonetheless, Canadian legal clinics should seriously consider filing such a claim as a
test case. The requirements as set out by the U.S. jurisprudence could be met with an
ideal plaintiff: an incident related to the denial of Charter rights, demonstrable loss
or injury, and most important, evidence of similar misconduct in the past that had been
complained about, yet remained unchecked by the complaints system. Such an action -
would not be easy to sustain and would certainly have the high resource costs discussed
above, but it would be a "political case" in the best sense of the words. Considering
the lack of political will in regards to policing issues, a high-profile case would allow
for the possibility of legal precedent on the side of police accountability and would
provide a focal point for renewed public debate on the issues that are simply not being
heard. While focusing on litigation can merely divert scarce energy and resources
away from political organizing, there have also been movements and issues that have
benefited from a two-pronged approach to social change; it is arguable, and likely true,
that police accountability could be one of those issues.
B. Community Organizing for Accountability
Despite the critique raised above, the community legal-clinic system requires a
systematic, cohesive approach to policing issues. While the following discussion is
not meant to be a blueprint, having an insufficient base in province-wide clinic debate
and consensus, several areas of clinics' policing activities require clarification and
consideration in terms of tactics and goals. It appears clear, however, that the overall
goal must be one of providing viable alternatives to participation in the police-com-
plaints system as it is currently constructed. Clinics also need to remain vigilant in the
sense of being prepared to capitalize on political and legal opportunities for police
reform as they arise, by maintaining sufficient resources, human and otherwise, within
the clinic network and individual communities to allow for a quick, coherent response
to issues or events.
i. Working with Individual Would-Be Complainants
Like many other clinics, PCLS does not currently have an official policy on assisting
people with filing police complaints and, as a result, there is no uniform approach to
working with individual would-be complainants who come to the clinic through the
CopWatch line or as neighbourhood walk-ins. The most common current practice
consists of fully advising people interested in filing police complaints about the
complaints process, the outcomes they can expect, and the possible risks involved in
making a formal complaint. If the person still wishes to file a complaint, she is either
given the resources to do it on her own or PCLS may assist her, the decision being
made case by case basis. This strategy is not meant to scare or discourage complain-
82. See Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 at Rule 30.
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ants, but rather, should be seen as a sort of "informed consent." In all likelihood, a
formal policy would probably not differ significantly from the process outlined,
although the benefits of consistency and authority would be welcome, as would the
internal debate required during the formulation of a policy. Another Toronto clinic
with a history of involvement in policing issues shares a similar approach. Justice for
Children and Youth has no official clinic policy on police complaints, and while clinic
lawyers will provide information about the complaints process, they will generally
advise clients to wait until after the conclusion of any criminal matters before
proceeding with a complaint.
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In addition, clinics can offer assistance with other strategies to would-be complainants,
particularly in regards to media work, referrals to community groups, legal advice, or
support services. This approach demands an analysis of each person's motivation in
seeking to file a complaint, as various goals (for example, having one's voice heard,
creating a public record, working out anger) will suggest various strategies. Personal
characteristics are-also relevant in this context, in terms of developing strategies
appropriate to a person's situation, particularly if it is a vulnerable one, and also
because the success of any resulting strategy depends on continued participation and
commitment.
ii. Policing Hotlines
Ideally, the CopWatch hotline and other like services will serve as more than a
repository of sad stories. The reference point for these projects is CIRPA's work in the
early 1980s, particularly its highly effective and multi-purpose phone line. Getting to
that point requires commitments from clinic staff or development of a volunteer base
of people willing to serve as intake workers for the hotline and a co-ordinator within
the clinic who is able to provide continuous support to the project. Community partners
are needed not solely for simple outreach and human resources, but also as allies who
will provide support when needed (for example, during events or at moments of
political opportunity) and lend the hotline credibility by underscoring its status as a
grassroots, community-based project, and helping to overcome a common reluctance
to engage in any aspect of the legal system, including clinics. Once these elements are
in place, clinics can plan on maximizing a hotline's possible applications:
1. Publicizing Bad Cop/Bad Policy Stories
When the CopWatch hotline was initiated, one of the primary functions was to collect
stories specific to the targeted policing program and to publicize them as a way of
countering government and media support for CAP, providing an alternative record
of the program's effects.84 Such action, whether in the form of a press conference,
Web site, printed release, or community presentation remains necessary. In the absence
of the PCC, a non-governmental provincial clearinghouse of such reports would be
especially useful for law reform and/or lobbying.
83. Mary Birdsell, supra note 43.
84. Committee to Stop Targeted Policing, Who's the Target? An Evaluation of Community Action
Policing (Toronto: August 2000).
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2. Maintaining an Alternative Database of Policing85
Another initial goal of the hotline was to keep track of police divisions, individual
officers, common practices, and problems and the like, in order to organize specific
campaigns around discreet targets. This method would grant the reports of anonymous
complainants much of the same resonance as those of people willing to be named, and
allows for the elucidation of patterns and realities that generally go unnoticed. Such
a tactic requires both the promotion of the hotline to the particular community in order
to build up a critical mass of complainants, and sufficient time--to collect complaints
and the confidence of callers. As in all this work, consistency is key, in the sense that
people are often made more vulnerable by exercising their legal rights and agitating
politically, meaning that allies and/or organizers cannot abandon a project or its
constituency halfway through.
3. Education about Legal Rights
The final goal of the CopWatch hotline was to provide an opportunity for people to
receive free, reliable information about their legal rights, and this was a central
component of the Community Forum launching the hotline. There is an on-going
debate amongst legal workers and activists on whether public education about legal
rights and police power is a useful tactic or an exercise that exposes people to
unnecessary risk. Within the Ontario clinic system, however, education about rights
in general has come to be seen as work of central importance and is often predicated
on a view that to withhold such information is to underestimate the street smarts and
survival skills of those people who have the most exposure to police work.86 Further,
demystification of the law has been a longstanding goal of all community legal work,
and in this context can "dispel disempowering myths about the police force, ' '87
allowing for the construction of the collective knowledge base required for political
organizing.
iii. Long-term Commitments
For clinics that have identified policing as an issue of importance and where the energy
to do work on police issues persists, a focus on the local community and constituency
and relevant local concerns ought to be a primary consideration, although combined
with a perspective on broader provincial and national trends. The clinic's catchment
area should be cross-referenced with the local police divisions, allowing clinic staff
to get to know the individual officers patrolling local streets and to develop "relation-
85. An issue that arose during the set-up of the CopWatch hotline was whether solicitor-client privilege
would attach to any reports or documentation arising from callers. Section 89(2) of the Legal Aid
Services Act, 1998, supra at note 49, provides that "[a]ll legal communications between a lawyer,
student or service-provider at a clinic, student legal aid services society or other entity funded by the
Corporation... and an applicant for legal aid services are privileged in the same manner and to the
same extent as solicitor-client communications." While it is not clear that all callers would be
considered "applicant[s] for legal aid services," community partners stated that simply being
physically located within a legal clinic provided the hotline with an additional measure of security.
86. See, for example, Community Legal Education Ontario, Police Powers: Stops and Searches: Know
Your Rights! (Toronto: CLEO, 1999).
87. Martin, supra note 5 at 173.
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ships" with officers and other division personnel in order to facilitate discussion and
resolution of concerns. Such an approach should not be seen as co-opting or partici-
pating in sanctioned 'community policing' programs, but rather as part of a commit-
ment to being vigilant and visible where others cannot be. If necessary, clinic staff and
other policing project participants should be in the streets just as the police are, but
providing visible opposition and monitoring misconduct. Targeted policing and com-
munity-policing projects in poor neighbourhoods requires a counterweight in the form.
of organizations that reject a "law and order" agenda yet remain willing to debate
policing issues and act on them.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Within the current police-complaints system, community legal clinics need to provide
viable alternatives to the formal police-complaints process in the form of community-
based information gathering and sharing coupled with a willingness to engage in
campaigns aimed at police and governmental decision makers. As legal organizations,
however, clinics should also be developing legal strategies to address the shortcomings
and failures of the complaints system, particularly in the form of test-case legislation.
Above all, legal clinics must be allies, willing to use their legitimacy and resources to
work for change, within both the legal system and the community.
The current police-complaints system is not working, and it cannot be perceived as
fair. Community legal clinics should be attempting to tip the balance in the favour of
accountability and justice.

